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Abstract
Fiscal decentralization provides local governments with authority and fiscal resources to
exercise decentralized functions, mostly public service functions. Income redistribution, as suggested
by t h e classic theory in fiscal federalism, should remain as central government’s domain. Some
recent findings and experiences provide different insight, arguing that in fiscal decentralization, local
governments’ policies can also have distributive consequences reflected in income inequality.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether fiscal decentralization significantly affects
income inequality in Indonesia. Empirical analysis is conducted using ordinary least square and panel
data estimation fixed effect and random effect, with fixed effect considered as the best fitted model. The
proxy for fiscal decentralization is revenue sharing funds (DBH), a component of intergovernmental
grants which local governments can utilize according to local priorities. The proxy for inequality is Gini
coefficient. Empirical result shows that fiscal decentralization has positive and significant effect on
income inequality, suggesting that a greater degree of fiscal decentralization tends to increase income
inequality.
In fiscal decentralization, the objective of local governments is public service delivery; besides, local finances
are insufficient to deal with major distributive issues. For these reasons, the central government ideally leads the
attempts to address income inequality. The findings of this paper suggest the potential of local policies to
support redistributive programs led by the central government. With the increasing role of local
governments in fiscal decentralization, the impacts of local policies should also be considered in
programs with nation-wide coverage such as the redistributive programs.
Keyword: fiscal decentralization, income inequality, Indonesia, intergovernmental grants
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I. Introduction
Under decentralization, public service functions previously dominated by central
governments are delegated to subnational governments.1 The spirit of decentralization usually
translates into improved public service which better suits the tastes and preferences of
communities in particular regions. The center of discussion on fiscal decentralization varies
across disciplines. From a political aspect, fiscal decentralization may focus on the division of
financial decision-making power between levels of government. Public administration relates
fiscal decentralization with the capacities of subnational governments to deliver equal public
service to citizens. From an economic standpoint, fiscal decentralization adds another dimension to
the center of economics’ central concerns: the allocation of resources and the distribution of income.
Given the various, sometimes even interrelated, issues surrounding it, fiscal decentralization is not
a policy goal by itself, instead it is a national strategy used to improve the welfare of citizens.
For this reason, fiscal decentralization should not be seen in isolation. The implementation
of fiscal decentralization policies has potential impacts on other policies. The impacts can
influence various sectors, such as political stability, macroeconomic sustainability, and public
welfare. Extensive research has been conducted to examine the link between fiscal decentralization
and other aspects, such as poverty reduction and income inequality (i.e. Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vasquez, 2010, Saachi and Salotti, 2011), income inequality and regional development (i.e.
Tselios et al, 2011), equity and poverty reduction (i.e. Hofman and Guerra, 2007), political
institutions (i.e. Beramendi, 2003), and political economy (i.e. Lockwood, 2005).
This paper focuses on the economic aspect of fiscal decentralization policies in Indonesia by
evaluating the impact of fiscal decentralization on income redistribution. Musgrave (1959, 1973)
and Oates (1972) argued that to achieve a welfare optimum, one of the primary economic problems
to resolve is attainment of the most equitable distribution of income (distribution problem).2 This
1 The word ‘subnational governments’ used in this paper refers to smaller government units within a country, e.g. provincial, district,
municipalities, city, or regency governments – depending on the administrative division in the country.
2 According to Musgrave (1959, 1973) and Oates (1972), the public service has three primary economic problems to resolve to
approach a welfare optimum: the attainment of the most equitable distribution of income (distribution problem), the maintenance
of high employment with stable prices (stabilization problem), and the establishment of an efficient pattern of resource use
(allocation problem).
2
provides a departing point to construct the main idea of this paper. If central government is to reach
the welfare optimum for all citizens, its policies should, to some extent, reflect this
economic interest. Traditionally, on the ground of efficiency, the function of income
redistribution is central government’s, as suggested by Musgrave (1959, 1973) and Oates (1972)
in their classic theory on fiscal federalism. Even though this point still predominates, there is a
growing opinion that subnational governments can indeed impact  income redistribution
through their policies (Beramendi 2003, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2010).
Numerous research has been conducted to test the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and income inequality, but a conclusive, ultimate result is not yet formulated. In
Indonesian case, research in this area mostly found relation between fiscal decentralization and
inequality, even though the direction of such relation is still open for investigation. This paper
tries to explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and inequality in Indonesia by
focusing on the area where subnational governments have discretion in fiscal decentralization
scheme – that is, the formulation of local policies that can impact income redistribution. The
purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether fiscal decentralization significantly affects income
inequality in Indonesia.
For this purpose, Indonesian revenue sharing funds (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH), a form of
intergovernmental grants, is used as the proxy for fiscal decentralization. The reason for selecting
DBH is due to its nature as unconditional grants, which allows local governments to have
discretion to formulate local policies according to local priorities. For income inequality, Gini
coefficient is used as the proxy. Other variables used to develop the model are population
growth, years of schooling, government size, openness to trade, investment, and gross regional
domestic products (GRDP) per capita. Data used for analysis are the data of 30 provinces in
Indonesia, obtained from publication by Indonesian government agencies. Empirical analysis in
this paper is conducted using Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and panel data estimation (fixed
effect and random effect), with fixed effect estimation as the best fitted model. The outline of the
study is as follows. Section II presents the theoretical background for this paper and current
practices in fiscal decentralization. Section III summarizes literature review. Section IV briefly
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explains fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. Section V explains the data sources. Section VI
describes the methodology used, i.e. selected variables and equation model. Section VII presents
empirical analysis and its results. Section VIII concludes.
II. Theoretical Backgrounds and Current Practices
Classic theory in fiscal federalism (Musgrave 1959, 1973 and Oates 1972) suggests that
decentralization does not only highlight the importance of delivering better public services, but also
caters different preferences among citizens in different regions. Decentralization is expected to improve
the efficiency in the allocation of resources, because subnational governments are likely to be better
informed about the lo ca l needs and preferences, compared to t h e central government.
The theory points that in fiscal decentralization, service delivery should be exercised by
subnational governments, while income redistribution should be addressed by the central government.
This is based on the assumption that, because of free mobility of citizens across regions, it is most
efficient if income redistribution function is performed by the central government. Assuming free
mobility, if subnational governments are to play a major role in income redistribution, ceteris paribus,
they should increase the tax burden of rich citizens, thus encouraging them to migrate to other regions
with lower tax rates. At the same time, poor citizens from other regions would move in, making the
cost of distributive policies increase while the tax base decreases as a result of the rich citizens’
migration. This is considered inefficient from an economic viewpoint. For this reason, distributive
policies should remain as the central government’s domain, since at the national level the effect of
mobility across regions can be minimized. Based on this, both Musgrave (1959, 1973) and Oates (1972)
are skeptical about the subnational governments’ active roles in addressing the inequality issue.
All in all, decentralization by itself cannot be the ground for economic welfare if inequality is not
properly addressed. There has been a growing and widely accepted recognition of the important roles
of subnational governments in formulating local policies that can directly or indirectly affect income
redistribution, but the most common international practice is that central governments play a major role
in this case, as suggested by the classic theory in fiscal federalism.
Some recent contributions in fiscal decentralization area provide different insights from this
theory. They suggest that potential benefits offered by decentralization, especially the better matching
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of public policies and local needs, can be undermined by differences in socio-economic endowments and
institutional capacities (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2005).
The inter-regional mobility on which the classic theory is based does not always correspond
with reality. Mobility is often costly, and other non-economic factors, like culture, also hinder the
migration from one region to another based solely on tax rates consideration. Pauly (1973) argued that,
when limited mobility is the case, subnational governments can be more important players in
distributive policies, even better players than the central government itself.
According to the findings, even though inequality is not the goal of fiscal decentralization, the
policies set by subnational governments under fiscal decentralization do have relation with
income redistribution, which eventually leads to income inequality. The expenditure and taxation
goals of subnational governments frequently have distributive consequences, even where the
decisions are based on efficiency criteria (Ahmad and Craig 1997). Subnational governments’ roles in
facilitating, catalyzing, and coordinating implementation of pro-poor policies are indeed reducing
inequality in practice, and have become an unavoidable concern of subnational governments
(Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2010). There is also an indication that greater fiscal
decentralization has contributed to a reduction of within region interpersonal inequality, although as
income rises, its capacity to contribute to a reduction in interpersonal inequality wanes (Tselios et al,
2011). Decentralization has distributive consequences that are contingent upon the existing structure
of inequality (Beramendi 2003). Because of this, the distributive effects of institutional designs
should be anticipated.
The findings provide the case for subnational governments’ potential in impacting inequality.
Fiscal decentralization comes with financial supports from the central government, most notably in the
form of intergovernmental grants, and authority to formulate regional policies that can impact income
redistribution directly and indirectly. To this extent, the nature of intergovernmental grants– whether
they are conditional/specific/earmarked or unconditional/general-purpose grants –is highly relevant to the
discretion of subnational governments to formulate such policies. The authority of subnational
governments is greater in the case of unconditional grants, since these grants are allocated according to
their priorities and to support the implementation of regional policies. In this case, fiscal
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decentralization opens opportunities to subnational governments to be more proactive in formulating
policies that can impact income redistribution and, eventually, also impacting inequality.
At this point, there are two major directions of the discussion regarding fiscal decentralization
and income inequality. The first one is suggested by classic theory, that subnational governments
should emphasize better matching of regional policies and regional needs, and leave the income
inequality issue to the central government. The second one is suggested by some recent contributions, that
in fiscal decentralization, subnational governments can impact income inequality. With respect to both
opinions, the relation between fiscal decentralization and income inequality needs to be examined
further. The unique situation of a particular region may greatly affect the examination result.
III. Literature Review
Previous research suggests that there are some conditions to meet if fiscal decentralization is
to have significant impact on reducing inequality, or that there is a limitation to which
fiscal decentralization can reduce inequality. The size of the government share of the economy
(Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2010), the level of income growth (Tselios et al 2010), the stage
of development (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2009), and the level of expenditure decentralization
(Saachi and Salotti 2011) are considered some of the factors that contribute to the inequality-
reducing effect of fiscal decentralization.
There are also arguments suggesting that a higher degree of decentralization can come
into conflict with distributional objectives, especially in countries characterized by large income
inequality (Ter-Minassian 1997). Redistributive implication leading to unacceptable regional income
inequality is identified as a major disadvantage of decentralization (Ahmad et al 1997). It seems
possible too, however, that the efforts to decentralize have no discernable impact on income
inequality (Morelli and Seaman 2007).
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2010) found that fiscal decentralization appears to help
reduce income inequality, only if the general government represents a significant share of the economy.
With overall central government budget around 20% of GDP or higher, they found a robust effect of
fiscal decentralization contributing to decreased inequality in the distribution of income. Tselios et al
(2011) pointed that greater fiscal decentralization in Europe is associated with lower interpersonal
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income inequality. They also found that in the international experiences, subnational governments
can play significant roles in improving overall income redistribution, directly and
indirectly. Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2009) found that the impact of fiscal decentralization on
inequality is highly contingent on the level of development, existing level of territorial inequalities,
and the fiscal redistributive capacities of the countries in the samples. In developed countries, fiscal
decentralization is associated with reduction in regional inequality. On the other hand, it is
associated with a significant rise in regional inequality in the case of developing countries.
In general, there’s not yet an ultimate conclusion whether fiscal decentralization
impacts inequality negatively or positively. The answer to this question may greatly depend on
specific conditions of a particular country. Research especially focused on Indonesia’s cases also
came up with various conclusions; i t vaguely answers the question whether fiscal
decentralization does have benefits to reducing inequality.
Using the Indonesian unconditional grants, DAU, as the subject of analysis, Lewis
(2001) found that DAU reduces inequality. Similar results are also suggested by Hofman et al
(2002). Different results were produced by other studies. Resosudarno and Vidyattama (2006)
assessed Indonesia’s regional disparities for the period between 1993 and 2002 and concluded that
disparity in Indonesia is still severe after fiscal decentralization. Aritenang (2010) also found similar
results. Hartono and Irawan (2008) mentioned that decentralization drove positive growth for all
provinces in Indonesia except Papua, b u t it does not help much on reducing inequality.
So far, research investigating fiscal decentralization, income redistribution, and inequality
has mostly found a relationship between them. However, the direction of the relationship is not yet
conclusive. This may be due, among other things, to measurement issue, potential endogeneity,
and reverse causality. A country’s uniqueness and special characteristics may also contribute to
the various outcomes. The determination of fiscal decentralization variable is also a possible
explanation. Regardless of this, it is generally agreed that most fiscal decentralization policies and
practices nowadays follow the classic theory, which in principle puts emphasis on delegating
public service delivery functions to subnational government, and leaving the redistribution
function to t h e central governments.
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It should be noted that governments’ policies do have potential impacts on sectors other
than those originally addressed by the policies. From this point, fiscal decentralization, which was
designed to respond to public needs of service delivery that better match their preference (though in
some cases, this can also be a response to a political situation), can have implications on other
sectors as well, including on income inequality.
IV. Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia
Following a financial crisis in 1997, the stability of Indonesian politics that had been
maintained relatively well for more than 3 decades was shaken. During that period, Indonesia was a
very centralized country. The fall of the country’s Suharto regime after numerous violent movements
pushed democratic reform, demanding the central government to share its control and power over
national affairs. Disintegration of Indonesia as a unitary nation was an escalating threat, and
responding to this, decentralization was implemented since 2000. The decentralization has included
political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization, with the central government and subnational
governments have had their functions assigned in particular.
Indonesian subnational governments consist of provincial government and local governments.
In decentralization, the delegation of political power and fiscal authority come together with the
responsibility to provide public services to local communities. Local governments play the major role
in providing public service, while provincial governments assume the coordinating function and are
the representatives of the central government.
Financial support to deliver public service is provided in fiscal decentralization through
intergovernmental grants. The law regulating fiscal decentralization is Law No. 33/2004 regarding
Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Subnational Governance. There are several
components in intergovernmental grants, but generally, the grants can be either conditional (with
restriction in its utilization) or unconditional (without strings attached).
Among the grant types, balancing funds are the most significant in term of nominal value and
number of recipients, and also the major source of revenues for most local governments. Indonesian
Ministry of Finance in Financial Notes 2011 mentioned that the objectives of balancing funds,
among others, are harmonizing funding needs in regions; improving the quality of public service
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delivery, reducing the gap in public service delivery between regions; supporting fiscal sustainability
and macro economy policies; and synchronizing national development programs with local
development programs. Balancing funds consist of 3 subcomponents as follows:
a. General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU)
Referring to Law No. 33/2004, DAU comes from national revenue, allocated to achieve horizontal
fiscal balance and to finance regions’ needs in the implementation of decentralization. Currently, a
general formula is applied in the calculation of DAU for all provincial and local government. The
general formula for DAU allocation is:
DAU = Basic Allocation + Fiscal Gap
= Basic Allocation + Fiscal Need – Fiscal Capacity
According to the Law, basic allocation is local official salary, fiscal needs is financing requirements
of the region in providing basic public services, and fiscal capacity is financing sources of the
region. The formula is expected to maintain proper spread of general allocation funds to needy
regions. While almost all subnational governments (provincial and local governments) are eligible
for DAU, the formula also excludes from DAU allocation the regions whose fiscal capacities are
sufficient to cover official salary and fiscal need. DAU is unconditional grants; it can be used
according to subnational priorities without intervention from central governments.
b. Specific Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK)
DAK is defined in Law No. 33/2004 as funds from national revenue, allocated to certain local
governments to finance specific functions, which are local governments’ functions and which are
parts of national priority programs. DAK is conditional/earmarked grants and formula-based. The
central government decides which local government to receive DAK based on general criteria,
specific criteria, and technical criteria. DAK is formula-based, and it targets sectors considered as
national priorities.
c. Revenue Sharing Funds (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH)
There are 2 subjects of DBH: taxes and natural resources. According to Law No. 33/2004, DBH is
funds from national revenue, allocated to regions on a percentage-basis to finance regions’ needs in
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the implementation of decentralization. The shared percentage differs among subjects. For example,
DBH natural resource from general mining is shared between central, provincial, and local
governments at the percentage of 20%, 16%, and 64%, respectively. DBH has the characteristics of
unconditional grants.3
Figure 1 below shows the summary of local governments’ revenues structure from 2006 to 2009.
Local revenues consist of own-source revenues, balancing funds (DAU, DBH, and DAK), and other
revenues. When combined, balancing funds makes the biggest share of local revenues. In particular,
DAU has been the major source of revenues for most local governments, followed by DBH.4 Compared
to DAU and DBH, DAK is relatively small in nominal value. Own-source revenues are revenue
generated by local governments by their own efforts, e.g. from local taxes and local retributions. Other
revenues are revenue not classified as own-source revenues nor balancing funds; included in this
category are interest revenues and donations.
Figure 2 below summarizes local governments’ expenditures from 2006 to 2009. Local
expenditures can be classified into 6 major categories: official salaries, service and goods, capital,
grants and subsidies, social and financial supports, and other expenditures. On local expenditures side,
salaries are the biggest expenditure item. Other major expenditures are capital expenditures and
service and goods expenditures.
3 Exception applied to 0.1% of local governments’ and 0.2% of provincial governments’ share of DBH natural revenues from oil, which
must be allocated for basic education.
4 The law regulating fiscal decentralization, Law No. 33/2004, mandates that at least 26% of net domestic revenues established in
national budget to be allocated as DAU. This makes DAU pool significantly higher than other intergovernmental grants. DAU is then
allocated to subnational governments according to general formula for DAU allocation. The application of the formula results in rich
subnational governments ineligible for DAU allocation.
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Recall that general formula of DAU allocation consists of basic allocation and fiscal gap, where
basic allocation refers to local official salaries. The inclusion of official salaries in DAU allocation implies
that some part of DAU is used for salary expenditure, and the remaining margin (i.e. the difference
between DAU and salary expenditure) can be utilized to support local policy related to public service or
redistributive program. 5
Figure 3 below shows the comparison between DAU and salary expenditure, highlighting the
margin that can actually be used to cover the fiscal gap. From Figure 3, it can be seen that the margin is
relatively narrow. This indicates that, even though DAU comes with no strings attached, a substantial part
of DAU is indirectly ‘earmarked’ by the portion allocated for salary expenditure. This can reduce DAU’s
influence in supporting local policy, including the policy that can affect inequality.
DBH, on the other hand, is allocated on percentage basis. Compared to DAU formula, DBH
formula provides greater degree of discretion to local governments, in the sense that unlike DAU, DBH is
5 The reason for including local official salary in DAU allocation can be traced to the beginning of decentralization. When
decentralization was first implemented, central government transferred its officials in public services sectors to local governments (and
provincial governments) to be a part of local bureaucracy. The salaries of the officials are provided by central government through basic
allocation in DAU.
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not intended to cover a specific expenditure that needs to be included in its formula. Furthermore, the
utilization of DBH is not restricted to national priority sectors like specific grants DAK. As specific grants,
DAK is intended to fund national priority sectors determined by central government. Local policies
related to DAK utilization is restricted by the term and conditions applied to DAK.
This paper examines whether local policies impact inequality in fiscal decentralization setting;
therefore the level of local governments’ discretion is considered an important factor to determine the
proxy for fiscal decentralization. DBH is considered most suitable to represent the situation of fiscal
decentralization, as it can be more freely utilized to support local policies, compared to DAU and DAK.
V. Data Sources
This paper uses panel data of 30 provinces in Indonesia. Each provincial data is the aggregate
data of local governments in the provincial jurisdiction. Observation period is 2003 to 2009. DAU data
is obtained from the National Planning Agency (Badan Pembangunan Nasional/Bappenas), DBH data
is obtained from the same agency (2005-2009) and from the Ministry of Finance (2003-2004). Other
data are obtained from Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS).
VI. Methodology
One of the central points of economics is income redistribution. From this view, in order to
bring economic welfare, income redistribution should be properly addressed. Failure to do so may
result in high income inequality that hinders growth. Income inequality can be influenced by
government policies. Fiscal decentralization, which mainly aims at service delivery that better match
local preference, is a government policy that impacts and relates to various sectors. Does
decentralization also relate to inequality? This paper tries to answer this question, focusing on local
governments’ role in decentralization.
Between subnational governments (i.e. provincial and local governments), local governments are
in a better position of making policies that directly affect local condition. Indonesian decentralization
focuses on local governments’ autonomy to make local policies that best match local needs, assuming
local governments as the government level with best knowledge of local needs.  Considering the
decentralization’s emphasis on local governments, this paper will focus on local governments as the
government institution whose policies have the most direct impacts on local condition.
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This paper uses Gini coefficient as dependent variable. Independent variables consist of
variables of interest (DBH per capita) and control variables. The selection of independent variables is
conducted based on theories and previous research. This paper greatly benefits from the models
developed in previous research, which provide essential guide in selecting variables, most notably from
the works of Barro (1999, 2000), Vidyattama and Resosudarno (2006), and Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez (2010). The empirical model to analyze inequality in question is represented by the following
equation. The model explains that GINI is a function of a constant, fiscal decentralization (represented
by DBH per capita), control variables, individual effect, and error term.
lGINIit =α0 +α1 lDBHCAPit + α2[CONTROLit] + ηit + µ it
GINI is the dependent variable observed for region i at time t. The main advantage of Gini
coefficient is that it is a measure of inequality by means of a ratio analysis. This makes it easily
interpretable. The simplicity of Gini makes it easy to use for comparison across diverse regions and
also allows comparison of income redistributions across different groups. Like any time-based
measure, Gini coefficients can be used to compare income redistribution over time, thus it is possible to
see if inequality is increasing or decreasing independent of absolute incomes. The limitations of Gini
coefficient largely lie in its relative nature: it loses information about absolute wealth.6 Despite the
limitation, Gini coefficient is widely used in various research as inequality measurement. Following
the general approach, Gini coefficient is used as the proxy for income inequality.
DBHCAP is the variable of interest, standing for DBH per capita. The variable is proxy for
fiscal decentralization. The values are at 2007 price, stated in per capita to capture the effects of
population on DBH share. DBH is selected as proxy because of two reasons. First, DBH can be used
according to the priorities of local governments, without intervention from central government. This
means that DBH provides local governments with the highest degree of discretion in formulating local
policies. Second, DBH is the second highest share in local revenues, suggesting their importance in
supporting local budget (please refer to Figure 1).
CONTROL variables are common variables used to assess inequality. This paper uses
6 For example, Gini coefficient in 2009 is 0.478 for Singapore and 0.480 for Peru. GDP per capita in 2010 is
projected to be USD 62,100 for Singapore and USD 9,100 for Peru (Source: CIA World Fact). Both countries have
close figures of Gini coefficient but differ greatly in absolute wealth.
13
population growth (POPGROW), years of schooling (EDU), government size (GOVSIZE),
openness to trade (OPEN), GRDP growth rate (GRDPGROW), and investment (INVEST). These
variables are selected as control variables because of the strong argumentation on their significance
on inequality, and the theories that support their employment in the empirical model. Natural logarithm
is used for variable GINI, DBHCAP, EDU, GOVSIZE, GRDPGROW, and INVEST. The use of natural
logarithm is to improve the model fit. If residuals aren't normally distributed then taking the logarithm
of a skewed variable may improve the fit by adjusting the scale and making the variable more normally
distributed.
Population growth (POPGROW) represents change in demographic composition. It has been
shown to be an important determinant to income inequality. Population growth reduces the relative
average income of those demographic groups growing faster, usually the poor, which in turn worsens
the distribution of income (Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2010). Years of schooling (EDU) is a
proxy to human capital. Recent studies support the hypothesis that generating and redistributing
human capital have significant impact on redistribution of income. Barro (2000) found that primary
schooling reduces inequalities, secondary schooling is not significant, and higher schooling increases
inequality. Chu et al (2000) found that secondary schooling negatively impacted inequality.
Government size (GOVSIZE) is measured by the ratio of total local government expenditure
over GRDP, and captures the importance of public sector in the economy. It is included because
the share of government in the economy determines the level of its impact on inequality (Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez 2010).
Openness to trade (OPEN) is measured by the ratio of the sum of export and import over
GRDP – what is meant by export here is products sold to other regions, and import is products
bought from other regions, whether it is within or beyond t h e national border. Barro (2000)
mentioned that the relation between trade openness and income inequality is significantly
positive. Reuveni and Li (2003), on the other hand, found a negative relation. Investment (INVEST) is the
flow of spending that adds to the stock of capital. GRDP growth rate (GRDPGROW) is the measurement of the
rate of change that a region's GRDP experiences from one year to another. The relationship between
inequality, investment, and growth as examined by Barro (1999) indicated the presence of overall relationship,
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with higher inequality being associated with lower growth rate in poor countries, but higher growth rate in rich
countries (Barro 1999). Another study shows that increase in GDP per capita growth tends to reduce inequality,
while increase in investment tends to increase inequality (Choi 2006). The provincial fixed effect capturing
individual effect of each province is represented by ηit, and µit is the error term.
Ordinary least square (OLS), and panel data estimation fixed effects and random effects are used
in the initial step on analysis. Analysis results produced by the three methods are then compared. The
conclusion is derived from the best fitted model, according to the nature of the data. To check which
estimation is considered as best fitted, diagnostic test is performed.
VII. Empirical Analysis and Results
The analysis is first conducted using OLS to estimate equation. OLS is a method to estimate
unknown parameter in a linear regression model. To be consistent, OLS requires that the regressors are
exogenous without multicollinearity, and that the errors are homokedastic, serially uncorrelated, and
normally distributed. Initial diagnostic test indicates that the data is suffered from the
heterokedastic problem, which violates the ideal condition for employing OLS, thus OLS is not
considered a consistent estimation. Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, shown in Figure 4, also
suggests panel data estimation random effect is preferred to OLS.
Figure 4: Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test
Referring to the initial test results, panel data estimation random effect and fixed effect are
considered. Panel data consists of 210 observations (strongly balanced data). A fixed-effects analysis
assumes that the subjects from where the measurements are drawn are fixed, and that the differences
between them are not of interest. Therefore, the variance within each subject groups together,
essentially assuming that the subjects and their variances are identical. A random-effects analysis
assumes that the measurements are some kind of random sample drawn from a larger population, and
therefore the variance between them is interesting and can bear information about the larger
population.
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000
chibar2(01) = 156.40
Test: Var(u) = 0
u .0072878 .0853686
e .004538 .0673643
lgini .0138951 .1178775
Var sd = sqrt(Var)
Estimated results:
lgini[prov,t] = Xb + u[prov] + e[prov,t]
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Hausman test performed on random effect and fixed effect estimations shows that fixed effect
(FE) is preferred to random effect (RE). The result is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Hausman Test
Since fixed effect is indicated as the more consistent model, Modified Wald Test is performed to test
whether fixed effect estimation model suffers from heterokedasticity. The result in Figure 6 shows that
heterokedasticity presents.
Figure 6: Modified Wald Test
To control for heterokedasticity, robust option is used for fixed effect estimation model. For
comparison purpose, the summary of estimation using OLS and random effect are also presented. Figure
7 below summarizes the estimation results using OLS, random effect (RE), and fixed effect with robust
option (RFE). According to test results, fixed effect is the best fitted estimation model, thus fixed effect
model will be used to explain the relationship between variables.
Figure 7: OLS, Random Effect, and Fixed Effect Estimation Results
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
= 46.69
chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
linvest .0499878 .0290208 .0209669 .0342945
lgrdpgrow -.0011956 .0017833 -.0029788 .
lgovsize -.0455433 .0495079 -.0950511 .0278936
open .0628562 .0760308 -.0131746 .0115346
ledu .1213981 .004755 .1166431 .1669649
popgrow .0011718 .0010926 .0000792 .
ldbhcap .0925404 .0696816 .0228588 .0117664
FE RE Difference S.E.
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Coefficients
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
chi2 (30) = 343.58
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
r2_a .13398719 .42866006
r2 .1629924 .44779584
N 210 210 210
_cons -1.7214368*** -1.6737388*** -1.9383799*
linvest .03150735*** .02902082* .04998776
lgrdpgrow .00805564 .00178325 -.00119558
lgovsize .05139867* .04950786 -.04554326
open .02515132 .07603081** .06285618*
ledu -.01438585 .00475503 .12139812
popgrow .00139806 .00109263 .00117182
ldbhcap .02862531** .06968157*** .09254041***
Variable OLS RE RFE
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Fixed effect result indicates that DBH per capita (DBHCAP), which is the proxy for fiscal
decentralization, is positively significant at 1% level of significance. Based on this result, with 99%
level of confidence, it can be concluded that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia during the observed
period, 2003 to 2009, significantly increased inequality. This can happen because the implementation of
fiscal decentralization may cause inequality not being properly addressed by neither central
government nor local governments. Some of the reasons are:
a. Central government’s capacity to address inequality decreased after decentralization.
Following the classic theory and the majority of international practices, income redistribution
program in Indonesia remains the domain of central government, regardless fiscal decentralization.
As pointed out by Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2010), fiscal decentralization
consequently demands central government to shift its resources to local governments, which
in the process may harm the income redistribution programs that could have been implemented
otherwise. This can be another possible explanation for Indonesia’s case.
b. Local policies put less emphasis on inequality issue.
In Indonesia, once the resource is shifted from central government to local governments, regional
policies do not always align with central government’s income redistribution programs. As one
can observed from the composition of local governments’ expenditures (Figure 2), salary
expenditures is dominating, implying that the number of people benefiting from this expenditure
is quite limited. On the other hand, expenditures that can directly impact more people, such as
subsidy and social/financial support, only represent relatively small portion of local expenditures.
From expenditure allocation standpoint, local policies’ impact on reducing inequality seems
implausible.
The fixed effect estimation result also shows that openness to trade (OPEN) is positively
significant at 10% level of significance. The result suggests that there is a positive and significant
relation between openness to trade and inequality, indicating that greater degree of openness to trade
tends to lead to greater inequality. In other words, with 90% level of confidence, it can be concluded
that openness to trade during the observed period, 2003 to 2009, significantly increase inequality.
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Openness to trade (both trade beyond t h e national border/international trade and within the
national border/domestic trade) may bring different level of advantage for different regions. Regions that
receive more advantage from trade benefit more that the less-advantaged regions, pushing inequality to a
more severe state. There are some reasons why some regions benefit more than others in the
presence of trade. One reason may lie on the hand of local governments. Some local governments are
more supportive to trade compared to others, thus making certain regions more attractive for trading.
The support may be in the form of regional policies, taxes, regulations, and procedures. Other reason
is that some regions can offer products that are highly demanded by, or highly appealing to, trade
partners. Because they have products that sell well, they can benefit more from trade compared to
other regions which don’t. To sum up, regions exhibiting advantages and necessary qualities
tend to reap more benefit with greater trade liberalization, leaving the less-fortunate regions
behind, and eventually increase income inequality.
The finding of this paper suggests that in Indonesia, a greater degree of fiscal decentralization tends
to lead to a greater degree of income inequality during the observed period, implying that income
redistribution tends to aggravate post decentralization. This phenomenon calls for attention because
high inequality hinders growth (Benabou 1996, Aghion et al 1999), worsens health outcome
(Smeeding 1997), increases social exclusion, declines confidence of government, and impairs the
functions of democracy (The World Bank 2000).
One important question remains: should Indonesia move toward greater decentralization? To
answer this question, it should be taken into account that fiscal decentralization interacts with both
economic and non-economic factors, such as political, cultural, and social factors. From a narrower
economic perspective, fiscal decentralization is especially viewed based on its roles in addressing the
central points of economic issues: resource allocation, income redistribution, and macroeconomic
management. From a broader perspective, fiscal decentralization reflects the balance between political,
cultural, social, and economic interests. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that there are aspects
in fiscal decentralization that cannot be explained by economic analysis alone, and that economic
reason should not be the sole reason to decide the degree of fiscal decentralization. Considering this,
future research focusing on multi-factors interaction in fiscal decentralization is strongly encouraged.
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IX. Conclusion
Analysis result suggests that there is a positive and significant relationship between fiscal
decentralization and income inequality in Indonesia. This confirms the findings of previous research
suggesting that fiscal decentralization has distributive consequences, and that a greater degree of fiscal
decentralization tends to increase inequality. The result implies that fiscal decentralization has
consequences on economic efficiency. This can be caused by the significant shift of national resources
from central government’s control to local governments’, thus reducing the capacity of central
government to address inequality. At the same time, local governments may put less emphasis on
programs with income redistribution impact.
The findings of this paper suggest the potential of local policies to support redistributive programs
led by the central government. It is important to note that the overall objective of local government is
public service delivery (Shah 2010), and that local finances are not capable of dealing with major
distributional problem (Musgrave 1973). Attempts to correct inequality thus ideally led by central
government, e.g. by using distributive fiscal policies (Musgrave 1959, 1973; Oates 1972; The World
Bank 2000). In Indonesia, this attempt still predominates. However, with the increasing role of local
governments in fiscal decentralization, the impacts of local policies should also be considered in
programs with nation-wide coverage such as redistributive programs led by the central government.
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